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A patrol walks in the Haji Pir pass sector of Kashmir region. (AP
Photo)
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The dispute over this region originated in the process of decolonization in South
Asia. When the British colony of India gained its independence in 1947, it was
partitioned into two separate entities: the secular nation of India and the
predominantly Muslim nation of Pakistan. Pakistan was composed of two
noncontiguous regions, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, separated by Indian
territory. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which had a predominantly Muslim
population but a Hindu leader, shared borders with both India and West Pakistan.
The argument over which nation would incorporate the state led to the first
India-Pakistan War in 1947–48 and ended with UN mediation. Jammu and Kashmir,
also known as “Indian Kashmir” or just “Kashmir,” joined the Republic of India,
but the Pakistani Government continued to believe that the majority Muslim state
rightfully belonged to Pakistan.
Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed
over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities
intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by
force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second
India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate. This time, the international politics of
the Cold War affected the nature of the conflict.
The United States had a history of ambivalent relations with India. During the
1950s, U.S. officials regarded Indian leadership with some caution due to
India’s involvement in the nonaligned movement, particularly its prominent role
at the Bandung Conference of
1955. The United States hoped to maintain a regional balance of power,
which meant not allowing India to influence the political development of other
states. However, a 1962 border conflict between India and China ended with a
decisive Chinese victory, which motivated the United States and the United
Kingdom to provide military supplies to the Indian army. After the clash with
China, India also turned to the Soviet Union for assistance, which placed some
strains on U.S.-Indian relations. However, the United States also provided India
with considerable development assistance throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
U.S.-Pakistani relations had been more consistently positive. The U.S. Government
looked to Pakistan as an example of a moderate Muslim state and appreciated
Pakistani assistance in holding the line against communist expansion by joining
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact (later renamed the Central Treaty Organization, or
CENTO) in 1955. Pakistan’s interest in these pacts stemmed from its
desire to develop its military and defensive capabilities, which were
substantially weaker than those of India. Both the United States and the United
Kingdom supplied arms to Pakistan in these years.
After Pakistani troops invaded Kashmir, India moved quickly to internationalize
the regional dispute. It asked the United Nations to reprise its role in the
First India-Pakistan War and end the current conflict. The Security Council
passed Resolution 211 on September 20 calling for an end to the fighting and
negotiations on the settlement of the Kashmir problem, and the United States and
the United Kingdom supported the UN decision by cutting off arms supplies to
both belligerents. This ban affected both belligerents, but Pakistan felt the
effects more keenly since it had a much weaker military in caparison to India.
The UN resolution and the halting of arms sales had an immediate impact. India
accepted the ceasefire on September 21 and Pakistan on September 22.
The ceasefire alone did not resolve the status of Kashmir, and both sides
accepted the Soviet Union as a third-party mediator. Negotiations in Tashkent
concluded in January 1966, with both sides giving up territorial claims,
withdrawing their armies from the disputed territory. Nevertheless, although the
Tashkent agreement achieved its short-term aims, conflict in South Asia would
reignite a few years later.

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